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Abstract
Mayday is an architecture that combines overlay net-
works with lightweight packet ﬁltering to defend against
denial of service attacks. The overlay nodes perform
client authentication and protocol veriﬁcation, and then
relay the requests to a protected server. The server is
protected from outside attack by simple packet ﬁltering
rules that can be efﬁciently deployed even in backbone
routers.
Mayday generalizes earlier work on Secure Overlay
Services. Mayday improvesupon this prior work by sep-
arating the overlay routing and the ﬁltering, and provid-
ing a more powerful set of choices for each. Through
this generalization, Mayday supports several different
schemes that provide different balances of security and
performance, continuum, and supports mechanisms that
achieve better security or better performance than earlier
systems. To evaluate both Mayday and previous work,
we present several practical attacks, two of them novel,
that are effective against ﬁltering-based systems.
1 Introduction
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are potentially devastat-
ing to the victim and require little technical sophistica-
tion or risk exposure on the part of the attacker. These
attacks typically attempt to ﬂood a target with trafﬁc to
waste network bandwidth or server resources. To ob-
tain the network bandwidth necessary to attack well-
connected Internet services, attackers often launch Dis-
tributed DoS (DDoS) attacks, where tens to thousands
of hosts concurrently direct trafﬁc at a target. The fre-
quency of these attacks is startling—one analysis of at-
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tack “backscatter” suggests that hundreds of these at-
tacks take place each day [19]. DDoS attacks no longer
requirea high degreeof sophistication. So-called“rootk-
its” are available in binary form for a variety of plat-
forms, and can be deployed using the latest off-the-shelf
exploits. Even worm programs have been used to launch
DDoS attacks [7].
While technical measures have been developedto pre-
vent [12, 20, 15] and trace [27, 10, 24] DDoS attacks,
most of these measures require wide-spread adoption to
be successful. Unfortunately, even the simplest of these
measures, ﬁltering to prevent IP address spooﬁng, is not
globallydeployeddespiteyearsofadvocacy. While there
is some interim beneﬁt from the incremental deployment
of earlier measures, they lack the deployment incentive
of a solution that provides immediate relief to the de-
ployer.
An ideal DDoS prevention system stops attacks as
close to their source as possible. Unfortunately, the tar-
gets of attacks have the most incentive to deploy solu-
tions, and deployment is easiest inside one’s own net-
work. Intrusivesystems that performrate-limitingorthat
require router modiﬁcations hold promise, but most In-
ternet Service Providers (ISPs) are unwilling or unable
to deploy these solutions in the places where they would
be most effective—in their core or at their borders with
other ISPs.
We study a set of solutions that are more resource-
intensive to deploy, because they require overlay nodes,
but that are easily understood and implemented by ISPs
using conventional routers. Trace-based reactive solu-
tions impose no overhead during normal operation, but
suffer from a time lag before recovering from an at-
tack. Our solution, an architecture called Mayday, pro-
videspro-activeprotectionagainstDDoS attacks,impos-
ing overhead on all transactions to actively prevent at-
tacks from reaching the server. Mayday generalizes the
Secure Overlay Services (SOS) approach [18]. Maydayuses a distributed set of overlay nodes that are trusted
(or semi-trusted) to distinguish legitimate trafﬁc from at-
tack trafﬁc. To protect a server from DDoS trafﬁc, May-
day prevents general Internet hosts from communicat-
ing directly with the server by imposing a router-based,
network-layer ﬁlter ring around the server. Instead,
clients communicate with the overlay nodes, who verify
that the client is permittedto use the service. These over-
lay nodes then use an easily implemented lightweight
authenticator, such as sending the trafﬁc to the cor-
rect TCP port on the server, to get through the ﬁlter
ring. Within this framework, SOS represents a partic-
ular choice of authenticator and overlay routing, using
distributed hash table lookups to route between overlay
nodes, and using the source address of the overlay node
as the authenticator. We explore how different organi-
zations of the authentication agents operate under var-
ious threat models, and present several lightweight au-
thenticators that provide improvedlevels of defense over
source address authentication.
Finally, we deﬁne several threat models with which
we evaluate pro-active DDoS protection. Within these
threat models, we present several attacks, including a
novel scanning method we call next-hop scanning, that
are effective against SOS, certain variants of Mayday,
and against conventional router-based ﬁltering of DDoS
attacks.
2 Related Work
DoS ﬂoodingattacks havebeenwell studiedin the recent
literature. Mostworkinthisareahasbeenaimedateither
preventingattacks byﬁltering, or at detectingattacks and
tracing them back to their origin. Overlay networks have
been used in many contexts to speed deployment of new
protocols and new functionality.
2.1 Attack Prevention
The most basic defense against anonymous DoS attacks
is ingress ﬁltering [11]. Ingress ﬁltering is increas-
ingly deployed at the edge of the network, but its de-
ployment is limited by router resources and operator re-
sources. Ingress ﬁltering also interferes with Mobile IP
techniquesandsplit communicationsystems such as uni-
directional satellite systems. Despite these limitations,
in time, address ﬁltering should become widespread, en-
hanced by mechanisms such as Cisco’s Reverse Path Fil-
tering. However, ingress ﬁltering is most effective at the
edge; deployment in the core, even if it becomes techni-
cally feasible, is not completely effective [20].
Mazu Networks [1] and Arbor Networks [4] provide
DoS detection and prevention by creating models of
“normal” trafﬁc and detecting trafﬁc that violates the
model. If an attack is detected, Mazu’s tools suggest ac-
cess lists for routers. If the Mazu box is installed in-line
with the network, it can shape trafﬁc to enforce a pre-
viously good model. Asta Networks’ Vantage analyzes
NetFlow data to detect DoS attacks on high-speed links
and suggest access lists to staunch the ﬂood [5]. These
access lists must be deployed manually, and provide re-
active, not proactive, assistance to the victim of a DoS
attack. Because these schemes result in access lists be-
ing applied at routers, many of the probing attacks we
discuss in Section 4 can be used against these solutions
as well.
Pushback provides a mechanism for pushing rate-
limiting ﬁlters to the edges of an ISP’s network [15]. If
attack packets can be distinguished from legitimate traf-
ﬁc (as in the case of a SYN ﬂood), Pushback’s mecha-
nisms can effectively control a DoS attack. In the gen-
eral case, Pushback will also rate-limit valid trafﬁc. If
the source of the trafﬁc is widely distributedoverthe net-
work, Pushback is less effective. In any event, Pushback
is effective at reducing collateral damage to other clients
and servers that share links with the DoS target, but this
scheme requires new capabilities of routers, slowing de-
ployment.
2.2 Attack Detection
ICMP traceback messages were proposed as a ﬁrst way
of tracing the origins of packets [6]. Under this scheme,
routers would periodically send an ICMP message to the
destination of a packet. This message would tell the
recipient the link on which the packet arrived and left,
allowing the recipient of a sufﬁcient quantity of ICMP
traceback messages to determine the path taken by the
packets.
To avoid out-of-band notiﬁcations, Savage et al. use
probabilistic inline packet marking to allow victims to
trace attack packets back to their source [24]. In this
scheme, routers occasionally note in the packet the link
the packet has traversed; after sufﬁcient packets have
been received by the victim host, it can reconstruct the
full path taken by the packets. Dean et al., treat the
pathreconstructionproblemas an algebraiccodingprob-
lem [10]. These reﬁnements improve the performance
and robustness of the packet marking, but the underlying
technique is similar to the original.
The probabilistic traceback schemes require that a
large amount of data be received by a victim before path
reconstruction can be performed. To allow traceback of
even a single packet, the Source Path Isolation Engine(SPIE)systemrecordsthepathtakenbyeverypacketthat
ﬂows through a router [27]. SPIE uses a dense bloom-
ﬁlter encoding to store this data efﬁciently and at high
speeds. While it provides exceptional ﬂexibility, SPIE
requires extensive hardware support.
2.3 Overlay Networks
Overlay networks have long been used to deploy new
features. Most relevant to this work are those projects
that used overlays to provide improved performance or
reliability. The Detour [23] study noted that re-routing
packets between hosts couldoften providebetter loss, la-
tency, and throughput than the direct Internet path. The
RON project experimentally conﬁrmed the Detour ob-
servations, and showed that an overlay network that per-
forms its own network measurements can provide im-
proved reliability [2].
Content Delivery Networks such as Akamai [31], and
Cisco’s Overcast [16] use overlay networks to provide
faster service to clients by caching or eliminating redun-
dant data transmission. The ideas behind these networks
would integrate well with Mayday; in fact, the Akamai
network of a few thousand distributed nodes seems like
an ideal environment in which to deploy a Mayday-like
system.
Mixnet-based anonymizing overlays like Tarzan [13]
are designed to prevent observers from determining the
identity of communicating hosts. The principles used
in these overlays, primarily Chaumian Mixnets [8], can
be directly used in a system such as Mayday to provide
greaterprotectionagainstcertainadversaries. We discuss
this further in Section 3.5.
3 Design
The designofMaydayevolvedfromonequestion: Using
existing network capabilities, how do we protect a server
from DDoS attacks while ensuring that legitimate clients
canstill usetheservicesitprovides? Toanswerthisques-
tion, we restricted ourselves to using only routers with
limited packet ﬁltering abilities, or more powerful hosts
that aren’t on the forwarding path. We wish to provide
protection against realistic attackers who control tens or
thousands of machines, not malicious network operators
or governments. Before exploring the design of our sys-
tem, we deﬁne these attackers and the capabilities they
possess. For this discussion, the server is a centralized
resource that is required in order to provide some ser-
vice. Clients are authorizedto use the service, but are not
trusted to communicate directly with the server because
clients are more numerous and more prone to compro-
mise. Overlay nodes are hosts scattered aroundthe Inter-
net that act as intermediaries between the clients and the
server.
3.1 Attacker Capabilities
DDoS attacks can be mounted with a relatively low de-
gree of technical sophistication. We focus exclusivelyon
ﬂooding attacks, and not on attacks that could crash ser-
vices with incorrect data. (Using the overlay nodes as
protocol verifying agents could prevent some data-based
attacks as well.) The simplest ﬂooding attacks (which
may be effective if launched from a well-connected site)
require only a single command such as ping. Many so-
phisticated attacks come pre-packaged with installation
scripts and detailed instructions, and can often be used
by people who may not even know how to program. The
greatest threat to many Internet services comes from rel-
atively simple attacks because of their ease of use and
ready accessibility. We therefore concentrate on simpler
attacks.
We assume that all attackers can send a large amount
of data in arbitrary formats from forgedsource addresses
of their choice. Ingress ﬁltering may reduce the number
of hosts with this capability, but is unlikely to eliminate
all of them. Certain attackers may have more resources
available, may be able to sniff trafﬁc at points in the
network, and may even be able to compromise overlay
nodes. We consider the following classes of attackers:
The Client Eavesdropper can view the trafﬁc going
to and from one or more clients, but cannot see trafﬁc
that has reached an overlay node or the target.
The Legitimate Client Attacker is authorized to use
the service, or is in control of an authorized client.
The Random Eavesdropper can monitor the trafﬁc
going to one or more overlay nodes, but cannot choose
which overlay nodes are watched.
The Targeted Eavesdropper can view the trafﬁc go-
ing to and from any particular overlay node, but not all
overlay nodes at once (i.e., changing monitored nodes
requires non-negligible time).
The Random Compromise Attacker can compro-
mise one or more randomly chosen overlay nodes.
The Targeted Compromise Attacker can select a
particular overlay node, or a series of them, and obtain
full control of the node.
We ignore certain attackers. For instance, an attacker
capable of watching all trafﬁc in the network, or com-
promising all nodes concurrently,is too powerful for our
model to resist. The difference between these global at-
tackers and the targeted eavesdropper or compromiser isone of time and effort. Given sufﬁcient time, the targeted
compromise attacker may be able to control all nodes,
but during this time the service provider may counteract
the offense.
3.2 Mayday Architecture
The Mayday architecture assumes that some entity—
perhaps the server’s ISP—has routers around the server
that provide its Internet connectivity, and is willing to
perform some ﬁltering at those routers on behalf of its
client. We term this set of routers the ﬁlter ring. While
the ring could be implemented by ﬁltering at the router
closest to the server, this would provide little attack pro-
tection, because the trafﬁc would consume the limited
bandwidth close to the server. Pushing the ﬁlter ring too
far from the server increases the chance that nodes in-
side the ﬁlter can be compromised. Instead, the ring is
best implementednearthe core-edgeboundary,whereall
trafﬁc to the server passes through at least one ﬁltering
router, but before the network bottlenecks become vul-
nerable to attack. To provide effective protection against
large attacks, this ﬁltering must be lightweightenoughto
be implemented in high-speed core routers.
The requirementfor a fast routerimplementationrules
out certain design choices. One obvious mechanism
would be for clients to use IPSec to authenticate them-
selves to a router in the ﬁlter ring, at which point the
router would pass the client’s trafﬁc through. If a service
provider is capable of providing this service, along with
rate limiting, a servershouldbe well-protectedfromDoS
attacks.
The Mayday architecture is designed to work with
more limited routers. Modern routers can perform rout-
ing lookups very quickly, and many (but not all) can
perform a few packet ﬁltering operations at line speed.
Clients, however, may be many in number, or the set of
clients may change dynamically. Client veriﬁcation may
involve database lookups or other heavyweight mech-
anisms. Access lists in core routers are updated via
router conﬁguration changes, so network operators are
not likely to favor a solution that requires frequent up-
dates. Creating an access list of authorized clients is
probably not practical due to client mobility and the
sheer size of such a list; we need ﬁlter keys that change
less often. We term these ﬁlter keys the lightweight au-
thenticators.
To handle the joint requirements of client authentica-
tion andfeasibleimplementation,we adda fourthtype of
party, the overlay nodes. Clients talk directly to an over-
lay node, the ingress node, not to the server or ﬁlter ring.
Some of the overlay nodes, the egress nodes, can talk to
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Figure 1: The Mayday architecture. Clients commu-
nicate with overlay nodes using an application-deﬁned
client authenticator. Overlay nodes authenticate the
clients and perform protocol veriﬁcation, and then relay
requests through the ﬁlter ring using a lightweight au-
thenticator. The server handles requests once they pass
through the network-layer ﬁlter ring.
theserverthroughtheﬁlterring. Iftheingressnodeis not
also an egress node, the request must be routed through
the overlayto an egress node. Figure1 shows the general
Mayday architecture.
Using this architecture, a designer can make several
choices to trade off security, performance, and ease of
deployment. First, the designer can ﬁrst pick one of sev-
eral overlay routing methods: more secure overlay rout-
ing techniques reduce the impact of compromised over-
lay nodes, but increase request latency. Second, the de-
signer can pick one of several lightweightauthenticators,
such as source address or UDP/TCP port number. The
choiceofauthenticatoraffectsbothsecurityandtheover-
lay routing techniques that can be used. The security and
performance of the resulting system depend on the com-
binationofauthenticatorandoverlayrouting. Wediscuss
the properties of these combinations in Section 3.6 after
describing the individual mechanisms.
3.3 Client Authentication
Clients must authenticate themselves to the overlay be-
fore they are allowed to access the server. The nature
of the client authentication depends on the service being
protected. If Mayday is used to protect a small, private
service, clients could be authenticated using strong cryp-
tographic veriﬁcation. In contrast, if Mayday is protect-
ing a large, public service such as Yahoo!, client authen-
tication may be only a database veriﬁcation of the user’s
password. Mayday leaves client authentication up to thesystem designer, since it is inextricablylinked to the spe-
ciﬁc application being protected.
3.4 Lightweight Authenticators
Mayday uses lightweight authentication tokens to vali-
date communicationbetweenthe overlaynode(s)and the
server. Maydayrequiresits tokensbe supportedwith low
overhead by commodity routers. Modern routers can ﬁl-
ter on a variety of elements in the packet header, such as
source and destination address, UDP or TCP port num-
ber, and so on. Several of these ﬁelds can be used as
authenticators. All “source” addresses and ports refer to
the egress node; “destination” addresses and ports refer
to the server. Each of these ﬁelds has its own strengths
and weaknesses as a lightweight authenticator:
￿ Egress Source Address: Source ﬁltering is well
understood by network operators, and gains effec-
tiveness when other providers deploy IP spooﬁng
prevention. It limits the number of overlay nodes
that can communicate with the server. SOS uses
this authenticator.
￿ Server Destination Port: The UDP or TCP desti-
nation port is an obvious key to use. If the over-
lay network has fewer than 65,000 nodes, this key
provides a larger space in which an attacker must
search to get throughthe ﬁrewall. It allows multiple
authorized sources to communicate with the server.
In other respects, it is similar to source address au-
thentication. The source port can also be used, but
this limits the total number of concurrent connec-
tions to the server.
￿ Server Destination Address: If the server has a
variety of addresses that it can use, the destina-
tion address can be used as an authentication token.
For example, if a server is allocated the netblock
192.168.0.0/24, its ISP would announce this entire
blockto the world. Internally,the serverwouldonly
announce a single IP address to its ISP, and send
a null route for the remaining addresses. Thus, a
packet to the correct IP would go to the server, but
packets to the other IP addresses would be dropped
at the border routers. The advantage of this mech-
anism is that it requires no active support from the
ISPtochangeﬁlters, anduses thefastroutingmech-
anisms in routers, instead of possibly slower ﬁlter-
ing mechanisms1. Because it uses standard rout-
ing mechanisms, updates could be pushed out much
1An interesting manual use of destination ﬁltering occurred during
the Code Red worm in 2001. The worm was designed to ﬂood the
IP address of www.whitehouse.gov,but had a hardcoded address,
not a DNS lookup. The site administrators changed the service address
more rapidly than router reconﬁgurations for ﬁlter
changes. We term this effect agility, and discuss
later how it can provide freshness to authenticators.
The disadvantage is that it wastes address space (a
problem solved by IPv6, though IPv6 has its own
deployment delays). Destination address ﬁltering
is unique in that it can be changed very dynami-
cally by routing updates, even in a large network
of routers.
￿ Other header ﬁelds: Some routers can ﬁlter on at-
tributes like protocol, packet size, and fragment off-
set. Each of these ﬁelds can be manipulated by the
egress nodeto act as a lightweightauthenticator,but
they require lower-level hacks to set. While they
could be useful for providing additional bits of key
space, they are less usable than port or address ﬁl-
tering, except to provide some security through ob-
scurity.
￿ User-deﬁned ﬁelds: Firewalls can ﬁlter on user-
deﬁned ﬁelds inside packets. This approach pro-
vides a huge keyspace and source address ﬂexibil-
ity, but few core routers support this feature.
Authentication tokens can be combined. Using both
source address and port veriﬁcation provides a stronger
authenticator than source address alone, making some of
the attacks we discuss in section 4 difﬁcult to pull off.
3.5 Overlay Routing
The choice of overlay routing can reduce the number
of overlay nodes that have direct access to the server,
thus providing increased security. These choices can
range from direct routing, in which every overlay node
can directly access the server (i.e. be an egress node),
to Mixnet-style routing (“onion routing”), in which the
other overlay nodes do not know which is the egress
node [13].
The choice of lightweight authenticator affects which
overlay routingtechniques can be used. For instance, us-
ing source address authentication with proximity routing
is extremely weak, because an attacker already knows
the IP addresses of the overlay nodes, and any of those
addresses can pass the ﬁlter.
￿ Proximity Routing: By picking the overlay node
nearest the client (similar to Akamai and other
CDNs [31]) or the node that provides the best per-
formance between client and server [2, 16], the
system can provide high performance with low
and ﬁltered the old address to successfully protect themselves from the
attack.overhead. In fact, when combined with overlay-
level caching, this design could provide better per-
formance than direct client-server communication.
Proximity routing requires that all overlay nodes
possess the lightweight authenticator.
￿ Singly-Indirect Routing: The ingress node passes
themessagedirectlytotheegressnode,whichsends
the message to the server. All overlay nodes know
the identity of the egress node.
￿ Doubly-Indirect Routing: Ingress nodes send all
requests to one or more overlay nodes, who then
pass the trafﬁc to the egress node. Only a subset of
overlay nodes know the identity of the egress node.
SOS uses this scheme.
￿ Random Routing: The message is propagated ran-
domly through the overlay until it reaches a node
that knows the lightweight authenticator. Adds
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
additional overlay hops, but provides better
compromise containment. In most ways, this rout-
ing is inferior to mix routing.
￿ Mix Routing: Based on Mixnets [8] and the
Tarzan [13] anonymous overlay system. A small
set of egress nodes conﬁgure encrypted forwarding
tunnels through the other overlay nodes in a man-
ner such that each node knows only the next hop
to which it should forward packets, not the ultimate
destination of the trafﬁc. At the extreme end of this
style, cover trafﬁc—additional, fake trafﬁc between
overlay nodes—can be added to make it difﬁcult to
determine where trafﬁc is actually originating and
going. This difﬁculty provides protection against
even the targeted eavesdropper and compromise at-
tacker, but it requires many overlay hops and poten-
tially expensive cover trafﬁc.
3.6 Choice of Authenticator and Routing
The major question for implementation is which combi-
nation of overlay routing and authenticator to use. An
obvious ﬁrst concern is practicality: If a service provider
is only able to provide a certain type of ﬁltering, the
designer’s choices are limited. There are three axes on
which to evaluate the remaining choices: performance,
security,andagility. Manycombinationsofauthenticator
and routingfall into a few “best” equivalenceclasses that
trade off security or performance; the remaining choices
provide less security with the same performance, or vice
versa.
High performance: Proximity routing provides the
best performance, but is vulnerable to the random eaves-
dropper. Works with any authenticator except source ad-
dress, since the address of the overlay nodes is known.
Blind DoS attacks against the system are difﬁcult, since
all nodes can act as ingress and egress nodes. Singly-
indirect routing with source address provides equivalent
protection with inferior performance.
Eavesdropping Resistance, Moderate Perfor-
mance: Singly-indirect routing, when used with any
authenticator other than source address, provides
resistance to the random eavesdropper and random
compromise attack, because only a small number of
nodes possess the authentication key.
SOS: The SOS method uses doubly-indirect routing
with source address authentication. In the SOS frame-
work, packetsenter via an “access node,” areroutedvia a
Chordoverlay[29] to a “beacon”node,andare sent from
the “beacon” node to the “servlet” node. The servlet
passes packetstotheserver. Thismethodprovidesequiv-
alent security to the singly-indirect scheme above, but
imposes at least one additional overlay hop.
Agility: singly-indirect routing with destination ad-
dress authentication provides an agile (and deployable)
system. Because routing updates, not manual conﬁgura-
tion changes, are used to change the lightweight authen-
ticator, it is feasible to update the authentication token
often. This agility can be used to resist adaptive attacks
by changing the authentication token before the attack
has sufﬁciently narrowed in on the token. Destination
address authenticationcan providethis beneﬁt in concert
with other authenticators (such as port number) to pro-
vide an agile scheme with a large number of authentica-
tors.
Maximum Security: By using Mix-style routingwith
cover trafﬁc, a service provider can provide some re-
sistance against the targeted compromise attacker (With
3-hop Tarzan routing, an attacker must compromise
24 nodes to reach the egress node). By using ag-
ile destination-address based authentication, the service
providergainsresistancetoadaptiveattacks. Bycombin-
ing the agile authenticator with port number authentica-
tion, the system increases its key space, while retaining
the ability to recover from egress node failures. Alter-
nately, source address authentication would slow this re-
covery, but it practically reduces the number of attack
nodes that can successfully be used since many Internet
hosts are ﬁltered.
3.7 Switchable Protection
By using destination address-basedﬁltering, we can pro-
vide switchable DoS protection: When no attack is
present, clients may directly access the service. When
an attack commences, the system can quickly and au-tomatically switch to a more secure mode, assuming that
some channelexists to notifythenodes androutersof the
change. This allows us to use Mayday as both a reactive
and a proactive solution.
The service provider is given two or more IP ad-
dresses. IP address
￿ is the “normal” mode address,
and the other addresses are the “secure” mode addresses.
When an attack commences, the service sends a routing
update (in the same manner as destination-address based
authentication) to change to one of the secure addresses.
The limiting step in reactive DoS protection is conﬁg-
uring access lists at many routers concurrently. To speed
this step, the ISP conﬁgures two sets of access lists in
advance. The ﬁrst list permits access from all clients (or
all overlay nodes, for proximity routing) to the normal
mode address
￿ . The second list restricts access with a
lightweightauthenticator,and applies to the secure mode
addresses. The servercan quicklyswitch modesbysend-
ing a routing update.
This scheme works best when normal mode is prox-
imity routingthroughall overlaynodes,and secure mode
involvesmorestringentroutingandﬁltering. Inthiscase,
theaddressestowhichclientsconnectdonotchange,and
client connections need not be interrupted at the com-
mencement of a DDoS attack. If a brief interruption is
tolerable, a DNS update can be pushed out to point new
connections to the overlay nodes.
3.8 Changing Authenticators or Overlay
Nodes
Changing the authentication key or the overlay nodes
through which trafﬁc passes could break currently open
connections. Fortunately, the communication between
the ingress node and the server is completely under the
control of the system designer. When a connection be-
tween the ingress node and server is interrupted by ad-
dress or port changes, the designer can use mechanisms
such as TCP Migrate [26] or other end-to-end mobil-
ity solutions to transparently reconnect the session. Us-
ing these mechanisms between ingress node and server
would not require client changes.
4 Attacks and Defenses
The ability of an overlay-basedarchitectureto resist sim-
ple ﬂooding attacks was explored in the SOS study. For
various simple attack models, a sufﬁciently large num-
berofoverlaynodescanresist surprisinglystrongattacks
targeted against the server or against individual overlay
nodes. In this section, we examine a more sophisticated
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Figure 2: The framework for considering attacks. Over-
lay nodes and clients are both outside the ﬁlter ring. In-
side the ﬁlter ring may be more ISP routers, which even-
tually connect to the server.
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Figure 3: A simple port-scan. The attacker sends packets
directly to the target to determine which ports are open.
set of attacks than the simple ﬂooding explored in earlier
work.
We view these attacks within the environment shown
in Figure 2. We ﬁrst present several probing attacks that
can quickly determine a valid lightweight authenticator
to defeat the DDoS protection. We then examine more
sophisticatedﬂoodingattacks, andexaminethe effects of
eavesdropping and compromise attacks. We assume that
attackers may learn the ISP router topology by various
means [28, 3] because it is a shared resource.
4.1 Probing
Several lightweight authenticators, such as destination
port or destination address, allow arbitrary hosts to com-
municate directly with the target. While this provides
ﬂexibility and higher performance, it can be vulnerable
to simple port-scanning attacks (Figure 3). If the target
machinewill reply to any packet with the lightweightau-
thenticator, it is a trivial matter to scan, say, the 64,000
possible destination ports, or the 256 addresses in a /24
netblock. On a 100 Mbps Ethernet, a full port scan takes
about11seconds. Topreventtheseattacksfromsucceed-
ing, a secondary key, drawn from a large keyspace, is￿
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Figure 4: Firewalking. The attacker uses a traceroute-
like mechanism to probe the ports that are allowed
through the ﬁlter ring, without needing replies from the
actual target.
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Figure 5: Idlescan indirect probing. The attacker spoofs
a TCP SYN packet to the target. If the packet gets
through the ﬁlter, the target replies with a TCP ACK to
the overlay node. The overlay generates a RST because
the connectiondoes not exist. The attacker notices the IP
ID increment at the overlay node when it sends the RST
to determine if the packet got through the ﬁlter ring.
needed. While packets with a valid lightweight authenti-
cator will go throughthe ﬁrewall, the server will respond
to only packets with the proper secondary key. Clearly,
this approach requires considerable attention to detail at
the host level for ﬁltering out host responses (ICMP port
unreachables or TCP resets). The secondary key could
be the addresses of the valid correspondent hosts, a key
inside the packets, or heavier weight mechanisms such
as IPSec.
The application of the secondary key is complicated
by techniques such as Firewalking [14] that use Time-
To-Live (TTL) tricks to determine what ports a ﬁrewall
allows through, without requiring that the target host re-
ply to such messages. Figure 4 shows an exampleof ﬁre-
walking. Firewalking can be defeated by blockingICMP
TTL exceeded messages at the ﬁlter ring, but this breaks
utilities like traceroute that rely on these messages.
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Figure 6: Next-hopscan. This attack combines the idles-
can and ﬁrewalking to determine from an interior router
if packets got through the ﬁrewall.
If the ﬁlter ring uses source address authentication, at-
tackers can use indirect probing mechanisms to deter-
mine the set of source hosts that can reach the server.
Tools such as Nmap [30] and Hping [22] can use IP ID
increment scanning (or Idlescanning) [21] to scan a host
indirectly via a third party. Figure 5 shows an idlescan
wherein the attacker watches to see if the overlay node
has received TCP ACK packets from the target. If it has,
it will reply with a TCP RST packet, because it didn’t
originate a connection to the target. Transmitting this
RST causes the overlay node to increment its IP ID, and
therefore an attacker can conclude that the probe packet
passed the ﬁlter by watching the overlaynode’s IP ID se-
quences. Thistechniqueis limitedto TCP,andcan bede-
terred by implementing IP ID randomization techniques
on the overlay nodes. This technique also depends on
low or predictable trafﬁc volumes on the overlay nodes.
A variant on idlescanning that we call next-hop scan-
ning can use other routers behind the ﬁlter ring to deter-
mine if spoofed packets are getting through. Figure 6
shows next-hop scanning. Like ﬁrewalking, next-hop
scanning sends a TTL-limited probe at the target, which
expires at some interior router
￿
￿
￿ .
￿
￿
￿ generates an
ICMP timeexceededmessage. Insteadofdirectlyreceiv-
ing this message (if it’s ﬁltered or the source address was
spoofed), the attacker indirectly observes the generation
of the ICMP reply by the IP ID increment at
￿
￿
￿ .
Figure 7 shows a next-hop scan in action. Between
sequence 93 and 94, the attacker machine sent 40 TTL-
limited probes at the target, causing a large jump in
￿
￿
￿ ’s
IP ID.Thistracewas takenusinghpingonaproduction
Cisco router on the Internet; the IP addresses have beenSource Seq # IP ID change rtt
192.168.3.1 seq=91 id=+19 76.5 ms
192.168.3.1 seq=92 id=+16 233.4 ms
192.168.3.1 seq=93 id=+14 259.6 ms
192.168.3.1 seq=94 id=+61 76.2 ms
192.168.3.1 seq=95 id=+12 76.6 ms
192.168.3.1 seq=96 id=+10 75.5 ms
Figure 7: Next-hop scan showing IP ID increase at the
router after the ﬁlter. After packet 93, the attacker sent
a burst of packets that went through the ﬁlter. This scan
method can be used to determine if spoofed packets are
permitted to go towards a target, but it requires that the
attackerbe able to communicatewith a routeronthe path
after the ﬁlter.
obscured.
Other host vulnerabilitiescan be used in a similar way,
but require that the overlay nodes run vulnerable soft-
ware. Unlike application or speciﬁc host vulnerabilities,
the IP ID scans are applicable to a wide array of host and
router operating systems. They are difﬁcult to defeat in
an overlay context because they require either upgrades
to the interior routers to prevent next-hop scanning from
working, or much more extensive ﬁrewalling techniques
than may be practical on shared core routers.
4.2 Timing Attacks
In an
￿
-indirect Mayday network in which only certain
overlay nodes are allowed to pass trafﬁc to the server,
a malicious client may be able to determine the identity
of these nodes by timing analysis. Requests sent to an
egress overlaynode will often process more quickly than
requests that must bounce through an extended series of
intermediate nodes; in SOS, overlay traversal adds up to
a factor of 10 increase in latency. This attack could al-
low an attacker to determine the identity of the egress
node even in a randomly routed overlay. This attack can
be mitigated by using multiple egress nodes and always
relaying requests to a different egress node.
4.3 Adaptive ﬂooding
This attack is one step up from blindly ﬂooding the tar-
get with spoofed IPs. If the attacker can measure the re-
sponse time of the target, by collusion with a legitimate
client or passively monitoring clients, he can launch a
more effective attack than pure ﬂooding. The success of
a DoS attack is not binary—intermediate levels of attack
may simply slow down or otherwise impair the service
provided.
Consider a lightweight authenticator whose keyspace
has
￿
possible values(all64,000TCP ports, orthe1,000
source addresses of overlay nodes). One value allows
trafﬁc to reach the target and consume limited resources.
The target has a certain unused capacity, its reserve,
￿ .
The attacker can generate a certain amount of trafﬁc,
￿ .
If
￿
￿
￿
￿ , the attacker uses up the target’s resources, and
the target’s service degrades.
In most DDoS attacks,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ : the attacker’s force
is overwhelmingly large. In this case, the attacker can
attack with multiple authenticators concurrently. If the
attacker uses
￿
￿
different authenticators, then 50% of the
time, one of those authenticators is valid, and
￿
￿
￿
￿ trafﬁc
will reach the target. If the service slows down, the at-
tacker knows that the authenticator was in the tested half
of the keyspace. By recursively eliminating half of the
remaining nodes in a binary-search like progression, the
attackercanidentifytheauthenticatorin
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
attack
rounds. After this, the full ferocityof the attack will pen-
etrate the ﬁlter ring. Evenintermediateroundswill likely
damage the target.
This attack is slowed downby a large keyspace. When
the attack power is sufﬁciently diluted (i.e.,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ),
the attack must ﬁrst linearly probe small batches of the
keyspacebeforeidentifyingarangeintowhichthebinary
search can proceed. Because this attack takes multiple
rounds, key agility is effective at reducing the threat by
allowing the system to change the key, ensuring that it
remains fresh in the face of an attack.
4.4 Request Flood Attacks
Without careful attention to design, the overlay itself can
be used by a malicious client to attack the target. An
attacker can use the Akamai network, for example, by
requesting identical content from many Akamai nodes
concurrently. By reading very slowly from the network
(or using an extremely small TCP receiver window), the
attacker uses very little bandwidth. The caching overlay
nodes, however, request the content as quickly as possi-
ble from the origin server, causing an overload.
These attacks are fairly easy to trace, and apply more
to large, open systems (such as Akamai) than to closed
systems with more trusted clients. However, they point
out the need for caution when designing a system to im-
prove performance or security, to ensure that the result-
ing nodes cannot themselves be used to launder or mag-
nify a DoS attack.4.5 Compromised Overlay Nodes
Controlling an overlay node allows an attacker not only
the ability to see source/destination addresses, but to see
the actual contents of the information ﬂowing across the
network. An attacker knows anything a compromised
node knows.
Furthermore, the attacker can now launch internal at-
tacks against the overlay itself. For example, the SOS
system uses Chord [29] to perform routing lookups. The
Chord system, and similar distributed hash tables, are
themselves subject to a variety of attacks [25]. Any other
component of the lookup system is similarly a potential
source of cascaded compromise when an overlay node is
compromised. This observation argues for keeping the
overlay routing as simple as possible, unless the com-
plexity results in needed security gains.
Proximity routing and singly-indirect routing can be
immediately subverted when nodes are compromised.
Doubly-indirectroutingprovidesadegreeofresilienceto
an attacker who compromises a node in a non-repeatable
fashion (physical access, local misconﬁguration, etc.).
Random routing and mix routing can provide increased
protection against compromise, but even these tech-
niques will only delay an attacker who exploits a com-
mon ﬂaw on the overlay nodes.
4.6 Identifying Attackers
It is possible to reverse the adaptive ﬂooding attack to
locate a single compromised node, if the lightweight au-
thenticator can be changed easily. The search operates
in an analogous fashion to the adaptive ﬂooding attack:
The server distributes key
￿ to half of the nodes, and
key
￿ to the other half. When an attack is initiated with
key
￿ , the server knows that the attacker has compro-
mised a machine in that half of the nodes. The search
can then continue to narrow down the possibly compro-
mised nodes until corrective action can be taken. This
response almost certainly requires the agility of destina-
tion address authentication.
5 Analysis
Analysis of “backscatter” trafﬁc suggests that more than
30% of observed DDoS SYN-ﬂood or direct ICMP
attacks involved 1000 packets per second (pps) or
more, and that about 5% of them involved more than
10,000 pps [19]. This study did not observe indirect at-
tacks that can take advantage of trafﬁc ampliﬁers, and
which can achieve even larger attack rates. Fortunately,
these indirect attacks can often be stopped using source
address authentication: There are no known attacks that
can indirectly generate spoofed trafﬁc.
How powerful are these attacks relative to the sites
they attack? A T1 line (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Mbps) is likely the small-
est access link that would be used by a “critical” service.
With full-size packets (typically 1500 bytes), a T1 line
can handle just 128 packets per second. The 30th per-
centile of DoS attacks is nearly an order of magnitude
larger than this. A server in a co-location center with a
10 Mbps Ethernet connection can handle about 830 pps,
anda100Mbpsconnectedservercouldnotwithstandthe
upper 5% of DoS attacks at 10,000 pps.
For a victim on a T1 line, the top 5% of attacks could
mount an adaptive ﬂooding attack against a 100 node
overlaywithsourceauthenticationinunder8rounds: Di-
viding the 10,000 pps by 50 nodes gives 200 packets per
spoofed node per second, more than the T1 can handle.
Thus, an attacker can immediately binary search in the
egress node space, taking about
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
rounds.
Many of the IP ID attacks take about 10 packets per
attempted key. At 1000 pps, an attacker could dis-
cover a destination-port key in about ﬁve minutes. In a
doubly-indirectoverlay using source address authentica-
tion (SOS), the attacker could expect to locate the egress
node’s IP address in about 50 seconds. Using both of
these keys, however, would force the attacker to spend
nearly 4 days scanning at extremely high packet rates.
Resource consumption attacks, such as SYN ﬂoods,
can be more destructive at lower packet rates; One study
noted that a Linux webserver could handle only up to
500 pps of SYN packets before experiencing perfor-
mance degradation [9]. SYN packets are also smaller,
andarethuseasierforanattackertogenerateinlargevol-
ume. By attacking multiple ingress nodes, and attacker
could attempt to degrade the availability of the overlay.
The top 5% of the attacks, over10,000pps, coulddisable
about
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ overlay nodes. Modern TCP stacks
with SYN cookies or compressed TCP state can handle
higher packet rates than older systems, but SYN ﬂoods
still consume more server resources than pure ﬂooding
attacks do.
6 Practical Deployment Issues
Could a Mayday system be practically deployed? We
believe so. Service providers like Akamai [31] have ex-
isting overlay networks that number in the thousands
of nodes. Over the last year, router vendors have cre-
ated products like Juniper’s M-series Internet Processor
II ASIC that are capable of performingpacket ﬁltering at
line speed on high-bandwidth links [17]. ISPs have his-
torically been willing to implement ﬁltering to mitigateextremely large DoS attacks; this willingness was tem-
pered by the inability of their routers to do line-speed
ﬁltering. With the deployment of ASIC-assisted ﬁlters,
ISPs should be able to deploya few access list entries for
major clients.
Mayday is primarily useful for protecting centralized
services. Services may use a central server to ease their
design, or it may not be economically feasible for a sin-
gleserviceto purchasemanyunder-utilizednodesto pro-
tect itself from attacks. In these cases, it may be par-
ticularly useful to take a service-provider approach, in
which multiple clients contract with a single Mayday
provider, who provides a shared overlay infrastructure.
The service-providerapproachhelps amortize the cost of
the overlay across multiple clients, and provides shared
excess capacity to deal with transient load spikes. Pro-
tecting clients in this manner allows a larger overlay net-
work, and reduces the number of entities that ISPs must
deal with for creating router access lists.
Finally, DDoS protection is only the ﬁrst line of de-
fense for servers. The objective of Mayday is to prevent
ﬂooding attacks from overwhelming servers. In the real
world, servers have a host of additional security prob-
lems that they must contend with, and interior lines of
defense must still be maintained.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a general architecture for using efﬁ-
cient router ﬁltering with semi-trusted overlay nodes to
provide denial of service resistance to servers. By gener-
alizingfromearlierwork,wepresentseveralnovelmech-
anisms that can provide improved performance with
equivalent security. Designers implementing the May-
day architecture gain the ﬂexibility to trade security for
performance to better create a system that matches their
needs.
To understand how overlay-based DoS protection
would work in the real world, we presented several at-
tacks that are effective against many router-based DoS
prevention schemes. By providing options for more pre-
cise ﬁltering and more agile rule updates, the Mayday
architecture can successfully reduce the impact of these
attacks.
While the Mayday architecture can provide a practi-
cal and effective proactive defense against DoS attacks,
muchworkremains. Currentrouterarchitecturesarevul-
nerable to probes like our next-hop scan, and correcting
these vulnerabilities will take time. Not all services can
afford to protect themselves with Mayday, but still re-
quire some protection. There have been many proposals
for detecting and preventing DoS attacks at the network
layer and up, and sorting through the options remains a
formidable task.
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